The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?
Kurt Weyland
Background:
This article by Kurt Weyland attempts to explain the key similarities between the Arab Spring of 2011 and the Revolutionary Wave of 1848, while also critiquing previous explanations which omit certain factors. The Arab Spring is widely known to have “sparked” in Tunisia in 2010 when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire, inspiring protests against the country’s authoritarian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This resulted in Ben Ali becoming the first leader in an Arab nation to be pushed out by popular protest. The world was stunned, and many Arab countries (Algeria, Jordan, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Djibouti, Sudan, Palestine, Iraq, Bahrain, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Mauritania, and at the borders of both Lebanon and Israel) began to protest their authoritarian regimes. This surge of resistance and contention was strong, swift, and short-lasting. For the most part, the results of this were authoritarian repression, continuation of violence, and civil war. In key cases, governments made hasty concessions (Yemen and Morocco), or autocrats resigned under pressure (Egypt, Yemen), although these cases did not result in any immediate real liberal democratic outcomes. The 1848 Revolutionary Wave (also known as the springtime of the people) “sparked” with the overthrow of France’s King Louis Philippe I. This resulted in a revolutionary wildfire spreading concentrically from France, and affected a wide range of countries in Europe and eventually in the Americas. This wildfire period was short (over the span of a year), large in strength and numbers, and had a low success rate. Kurt explains that among the waves of democratisation and revolution that the modern world has experienced, these two stand out. These two spurs of revolution have a lot of similarity, but what stands out is their fast and intense spread, and their disappointingly low rate of democratic success. These two surges were very far apart in time, with one revolting against traditional monarchies, while the other against sultanistic republics. Despite these differences they exhibited similar velocity, breadth, and consequences. So what are the causes behind the similarities seen in these two events? Namely, why did they happen so quickly, and amount to so little? This pertains to our class, because it in part asks: why were these countries, where people overwhelmingly wanted democracy, unable to translate this desire into outcome?
Causal Mechanisms of Similarity:
Weyland states that “Conventional approaches cannot account well for these similarities”, and uses this article to try and fill the gaps. Some theories emphasise common causes, like economic crisis, and acute social problems as an explanation for why both the European Springtime of the People and the Arab Spring spread so widely. What it doesn’t explain is the crisp nature of these waves. Similar contentious problems can cause similar revolts, however it does not explain the fact that the revolts of 2011 and 1848 all took place over such a small period of time. Common cause theories also point to the increase in capabilities (modernization theory) for the Arab Spring. The modernisation of social media and communication via technological advancement could account for the quick and wide spread of revolution in 2011. This lane of thinking, while partially true, does not account for the triggering mechanism that caused this spread, nor does it explain the 1848 revolutionary wave. It is true however, that the Arab Spring spread more randomly, whereas the Springtime of the People spread concentrically around France due to different mechanisms of information delivery. The next set of theories that Weyland mentions involves foreign influence. Did foreign powers and promotion of political change put kindle under the spreading fire? Did international activist groups help orchestrate these movements? It seems as if this is not the case. In both instances, there was little involvement of foreign powers. One exception is the case of Libya, where the United States intervened in order to take-down al-Gaddafi. If anything, during the Arab Spring, the United States was more concerned with what this storm meant for its regional allies. The last set of theories are demonstration and contagion theories. These suggest that the spread of revolution could be a result from the spread of new norms, ideas, and values that disagree with authoritative rule. This includes rational learning from the initial sparks of these surges. Demonstration and contagion is closest to agreement with what Weyland suggests, however does not account for the sheer speed of diffusion seen in 1848 and in 2011. Furthermore, countries had varying pre-existing value systems and value intensities. The spread of values and norms would not have the same timely effect on each country, and therefore does not account for the critical levels of support that happened all at the same time. This can be explained by rational learning however, where the revolutionary events in France and in Tunisia provided new information, quickly changing the cost/benefit analysis associated with defiance. This still leaves the low success rate of these surges unexplained. Weyland suggests that rather than rational learning, this lack of outcome can be explained by cognitive shortcuts that resulted in divergence from rationality and poor decision making. He also uses poor organisation as a factor of the low success outcomes of these large scale contentions.
Cognitive shortcuts: Availability/Representative heuristics and poor Organisation
Why infer that the fall of one autocrat, in another country, with a different political landscape, means that other autocrats are vulnerable? Regime stability, ruler personality, regime institutions, activist presence, and more can differ greatly between autocracies. It doesn’t necessarily make sense to assume that the fall of Louis Philippe I meant that nearby European autocracies were vulnerable, nor does it make sense to assume that the fall of Ben Ali meant that other countries in MENA were in the opportune moment for liberal democracy to take them by storm. Therefore, these initial successes don’t justify the high hopes that drove such powerful and swift waves. Weyland points out that during the Springtime of the People and the Arab Spring, emulative protestors deviated from rationality, and were too captivated by the precedent to think past the first scraps of news or unfounded rumours that came their way. This resulted in them jumping to the conclusion that these regimes and political systems were equivalent, allowing them to think that they could replicate the initial success. For this, Weyland blames cognitive shortcuts. In particular, what he refers to as the availability and representative heuristics. The availability heuristic essentially allows dramatic, vivid events to make a disproportionate effect on you. For example, someone in Tunisia lighting themselves on fire, and instigating a successful revolution. It skews people's ability to estimate value and probability. It can cause less striking, however valid information (like the current state of your own country) to be discounted. Drastic and vivid events can cause people to overestimate their likelihood (ex: 9/11). The Representative heuristic causes people to draw inferences from seeming similarities (like those between one’s own country and one that recently had a successful revolution), while neglecting other dissimilarities. People tend to see a small sample, and believe that it represents the whole, when in reality that may not be the case. In this way, an initial success can cause people to incorrectly believe that they would also be successful. The underestimate of these key differences could in part be responsible for the lack of success in the Springtime of the People and the Arab Spring. These two heuristics could help explain the swift spread of revolution, and the repeated emulation seen in these cases. Weyland then suggests that an organisational setting guides how individual cognitive heuristics influence politics. Essentially, with less organisational power, cognitive heuristics reign more freely, resulting in less thought out movement. During the mid 1800s, Central European societies were weakly organised. There were few organisations that had large numbers of citizens, especially those above the local level. As a result, in 1848, cognitive heuristics ran wild, causing full force, head on revolutions that ran out of steam quickly. However, during the second half of the 1800s, large-scale organisational-building resulted in slowed down diffusion of political contention. In MENA (2011), decades of authoritarian rule had made it difficult for large scale organisations to emerge and be maintained. For the most part, the revolutions of the Arab Spring lacked clear leadership, and as a result were unable to make rational, filtered, and comparative decision making. Intensive revolutions in the Arab Spring crumbled quickly, unable to translate their effort and desire into tangible democratic outcomes.
The Arab Spring as well as the 1848 Wave of Revolution are prime examples of how the desire for democracy is not the only factor in becoming democratic. It is clear that Tunisia and France became democratic at a moment of opportunity, whereas other emulating protests failed to realise key differences in their countries that meant they did not have the needed opportunity to revolt. As seen in many countries involved (Yemen, Syria, Iran, Libya), poorly timed and orchestrated contention resulted in a loss of stability, and/or worsening conditions. Large Organisations, preference for democracy, and civic capital are thought to be important for becoming democratic, but unfortunately it is very difficult to develop these factors under authoritarian rule. This is a difficult cycle to break, and Weyland does a thorough job of explaining how a lack of organisation and cognitive shortcuts can cause misjudgement on when is an opportune moment to break this cycle. This article is very compelling and interesting, however is highly anecdotal and not based strongly on proven causes. It is difficult to critique him for that, as he refers to this work as a “plausibility probe”. One issue however, is that Weyland over simplifies the events that took place in so many countries as to better apply his theory. Both periods were highly complex, and varied from country to country, and Weyland relies too heavily on cognitive shortcuts while ignoring socio-economic factors, geopolitics, and leadership structures. Overall Weyland had compelling arguments, which are worth further solidification.
Weyland K. The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848? Perspectives on Politics. 2012;10(4):917-934. doi:10.1017/S1537592712002873
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